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NOTES
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS-DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-IMPROPER COL-
LECTION PRACTIcEs.-In a credit sale transaction, the congenial re-
lationship existing between buyer and seller, as well as the credit-
or's optimistic expectation of prompt payment are often short lived.
Virtually without exception, the average businessman will attempt
to obtain payment by means other than court action. It is at this
point that the prudent creditor would do well to recognize that
collection practices, however efficacious, which transgress certain
ill defined bounds have not infrequently born fruit in the form of a
law suit rather than in remittance of a balance due.
Included among the grounds upon which a creditor's liability
for the utilization of improper collection methods has been pre-
dicated are: (1) libel or slander, (2) invasion of the right of
privacy, (3) intentional infliction of mental anguish, and (4)
assault by agent.
I. Libel or Slander
Truth of a publication is generally recognized as a complete
defense to an action based upon either libel or slander, irrespec-
tive of the motive inducing the publication.1 When this defense
cannot be interposed, it must be determined whether the publica-
tion is slanderous or libelous per se, or whether it will be necessary
to prove some special damage in order to sustain the action.
Slanderous words are actionable only by virtue of falling within
certain time honored categories2 or upon proof that their publica-
tion has caused special damages.3 Hence, the statement that, "Your
credit is no good", has been held not to be slanderous per se when
made to a law stenographer, as her occupation was not one where
credit was especially vital.4
1. Restatement, Torts § 582 (a) (1936); see Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107
A'.2d 860, 862 (1954). A few states, including North Dakota, require that there :nust
have heen some justifiable purpose for the publication. See, e. g., N. D. Const. Art. I,
§9; Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
2. The charge of having committed a previous crime, of having certain loathsome dis-
eases, any imputation affecting one adversely in his business, trade, profession, or' office,
and in some jurisdictions, of which North Dakota is one, the imputation of unchastity or
impotence, constitutes the four kinds of slander per se. See N. D. Rev. Code §14-0204
('1943); Prosser, Torts, 799, 801, 804 (1941).
3. Campbell v. Post Publishing Co., 94 Mont. 12, 20 P.2d 1063'(1933); see Urban
v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292, 295, 296 (1952). The term "special
damages" has reference to actual financial loss as distinguished from general damages such
as wounded feelings, resulting pain and illness, or injury to reputation. Prosser, Torts,
793, 805, 806 (1941).
4. Liebel v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936). See
Ringgold v. Land, 212 N.C. 369, 193 S.E. 267 <1937) (The statement that, "You are a
* * . dishonest man who gets a man's goods and not pay for them . . . you are a
common d --- s --- o - b - , was held not actionable in the absence of a showing
of special damages).
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Theoretically at least, substantial damage is presumed to follow
any libelous publication.5 There would consequently seem to be
little reason for differentiating between "libel" and "libel per se" for
the purpose of requiring a showing of special damage when the
statement is not libelous "per se." Nevertheless, a distinction has
been drawn, for example, between those to whom credit is im-
portant in the prosecution of a business and those to whom it is
not. As to the latter, a libelous declaration that a debt is owed,'
or of a failure or inability" to pay a debt, is actionable only upon
proof of special damage9 As to the former, such an averment will
be considered actionable per se.10 Any libelous publication will,
however, be considered libelous per se if, by imputing that the
debtor is unwilling to pay his debts or that he is unworthy of
credit, it tends to destroy his reputation for integrity and fair
dealing.1"
.5. See Frechette v. Special Magazines, 136 N. Y. S.2d 448, 453 (N. Y. 1954). N. D.
Rev. Code §14-0203 (1943) Civil Libel Defined. Libel is a false and unprivileged publi-
cation by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which
exposes any person tQ hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or atoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.
6. M. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 29 S. E.2d 375 (1944).
7. Hollenbeck v. Hall, 103 Iowa 214, 72 N.W. 518 (1897) (A creditor wrote to his
debtor's employer that the debtor bad "cowardly slunk" behind the defense of statutory
limitation when sued and that the creditor would prefer not to be connected in an official
capacity with anyone giving employment to men of such character. Held not libelous, the
court stating that there was nothing disgraceful about being in debt and that as the law
recognized the defense of the statute of limitations as being honorable, an accusation that
one had used it could not possibly amount to defamation).
8. Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac. 573 (1905) (Plaintiff was a
candidate for delegate to a convention. Defendant published a card on one side of which
were the words, "Vote for Honest Jake Bosch for Delegate", and on the other side of
which was printed, "Explanatory. Mr. C. A. Nichols owes the Daily Reporter a balance
of $34.25 for printing done in 1894. Draw your own conclusions and vote for Mr. Nichols
if you think he is not able to pay this debt." Held not libelous per se).
9. Estes v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, 50 Ga. App. 619, 179 S.E. 222 (1935); Hudson v.
Slack Furniture Co., 318 11. App. 15, 47 N.E.2d 502 (1943) (Publication of a false
wage assignment held not libelous per se as to a telegrapher); Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105
Iowa 488, 75 N.W. 355 (1898) (Suit based on same publication as in Hollenbeck v. Hall,
supra note 8. Held actionable when special damages are shown).
10. Cf. Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., 115 Ind. App. 10, 55 N.E.2d 382 (1944);
Yelle v. Cowles Publishing Co., 278 P.2d 671 (Wash. 1955).
11'- Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (:909) (Creditor has written his
agent, a bank, as follows: ". . . We return the papers in the Ferdon case with the
request that you present them again, and if not paid, please turn them over to some
justice of the peace with instructions to sue on the knowledge that Mr. Ferdon is about
to leave the state for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The account is long past
due, and if Mr. Ferdon's intentions were honest and sincere, he would have remitted a
long time ago . . . he can pay you just as well as paying us if he has any honesty or
sincerity of purpose to pay." Held libelous as imputing an unwillingness to pay a just
debt); Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918) (Credi-
tor placed a number of large yellow cards around debtor's house bearing notice that a
collector had been there seeking payment and that payment of the account would pre-
vent the annoyance of further calls); Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N.W. 862 (1885)
(Creditor published under "advertisements" in a newspaper, "Wanted, E. B. Zier, M.D., to
pay a drug bill."); Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 18 N.W. 387 (1883) (De-
fendant placed on furniture in front of his store two placards, one of which read,
"This was taken from Dr. Woodling, as he would not pay for it . . .", and the other
of which read, "Moral: Beware of Deadbeats."); Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46
N.W. 123 (1890) (Dun letters were sent in red envelopes conspicuously printed "for
collecting bad debts").
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Reporting a delinquent debtor to a mutual credit organization is
usually privileged."' But the privilege, which is conditional only,
13
may be lost if the publication is made in bad faith 14 or as a means
for coercion of payment.
1
5
II. Invasion of the Right of Privacy
The right of privacy,1" unknown at common law, has, since
1890,' gained steadily increasing recognition in the United States."
Truth, which is generally a good defense to an action based on
defamation,19 is not a defense to an invasion of the right of pri-
vacy,2' and malice, 2 or its absence, 22 as well as mistakes,'2  is
immaterial.
In Brents v. Morgan,' 4 the plaintiff was awarded damages for
injury to his right of privacy when the defendant displayed in the
window of his business establishment a sign five feet by eight feet
upon which appeared statements to the effect that the plaintiff
owed the defendant a past due account; that if promises would
discharge the obligation it would long since have been liquidated;
and that the account would be advertised until paid. And when a
merchant caused the publication in a local newspaper of a notice
that a customer owed a past due grocery account, both the merchant
and the newspaper were held liable on the same theory.25
But in Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel Co., 2  recovery
was denied a plaintiff whose account had been advertised, via
orange colored handbills, as being for sale to the highest bidder.
12. See Diamond v. Krasnow, 136 Pa. 68, 7 A.2d 65, 69 (1939).
13. See Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S.W. 257 (1911)
(A communication is qualifiedly privileged when it concerns a subject in which the
communicator has a legitimate interest and when it is made to another who has a cor-
responding interest); Prosser, Torts, §94 (1941).
14. Werner v. Vogeli, 10 Kan. App. 538, 63 Pac. 607 (1901); cf. Fulton v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 67 S.E.2d 425 (S. C. 1952).
15. Tuyes v. Chamers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) (A creditor caused his
debtor's name to be placed on a list of delinquent debtors and then threatened to widely
buhlicize the list).
16. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F.Supp. 352, 353 (S.D. N. Y. 1939) (The
right of privacy is generally defined as "the right to be let alone; the right of a person to
he free from unwarranted publicity."); Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,
306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940) ("The fundamental difference between a right
of privacy and a right to freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns
one's own peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily one's reputation . . .").
17. An article by Warren and Brandeis in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 is generally credited
with having defined the right of privacy as the basis for an independent tort.
18. See Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538, 542, 543 (D. Conn. 1953).
19. See note 1 supra.
20. See Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky.).
21. See Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1940).
22. See Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash.2d 267, 177
P.2d 896, 899 (1947) ("Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the offense . . .").
23. See Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942).
24. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
25. Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
26. 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
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The debtor has likewise failed to prevail where a creditor has
written 27 or phoned28 the debtor's employer in regard to the in-
debtedness, or has billed the debtor by telegram in the mistaken
belief that a debt was past due."
It is significant that an aggrieved debtor has seldom successfully
maintained an action based upon a purported invasion of his right
to privacy. The suggestion that, ". . . privacy becomes important
because no other remedy is available,"3 1 would seem to be particu-
larly applicable to suits by oppressed debtors.
III. Intentionally Inflicted Mental Anguish
That the acclaim1 with which writers have heralded the decision
in Wilkinson v. Downton3* has not been without influence upon the
judiciary is evidenced by the fact that an increasing number of
courts, especially in recent years, have granted redress for disrup-
tion of emotional tranquillity."a With few exceptions, 4 negligently
infilicted mental disturbance, when unaccompanied by some tan-
gible physical harm, is not actionable. 35 But when mental disturb-
ance has been intentionally provoked, resultant physical injury,
although greatly enhancing the likelihood of substantial damages, is
no longer universally considered indispensable to recovery.36 Even
so, the courts have realistically recognized that minor wounds of
hypersensitive sensibilities are not torts, and have restricted liability
to acts of a particularly flagrant character.y1
Exemplifying such reprehensible conduct is that of an under-
taker who delayed cremation of the, body of a debtor's son in a
27. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1951).
.28. Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 399
(1947).
29.. Davis v. General Finance and Thrift Corp., 80 Gka.App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
30. Prosser, Torts 1054 (1941).
31. See, e.g., Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L.
Rev. 63 (1950); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
Mich. L. Rev. 874 (1939); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Field of
Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Dam-
age, 20 Mich L. Rev. 497 (1923).
32. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (This is the leading case allowing recovery for intentionally
inflicted mental suffering when followed by physical injury).
33. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Erwin v.
Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934); Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App2d 313,
198 P 2d 696 (1948); Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Great At-
lantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 At. 22 (1931); Johnson v. Samp-
son, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
34. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930)
(negligently sent telegram); Clemm v. A. T. & S. F. R. R., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103
(1928) (negligently mishandled corpse). Contra: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight,
254 U.S. 17 (1920) (negligently sent telegram); Kneass v. Cremation Society of Wash-
ington, 103 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918) (negligently mishandled corpse).
35. E.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1953).
36, Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953). Contra: Harned v.
E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
37. Prosser, Torts 65 (1941).
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ghoulish attempt to obtain payment of a past due account.38 In
one of the few other debt collection cases"9 in which recovery has
been allowed for mental suffering alone the court observed that:
"The rule seems to be well established that where an .act is
willful or malicious, as distinguishd from being merely negli-
gent, recovery may be had for mental pain, though no physical
injury results."4
°
However well established the rule may be, its manifest difficulty
of application has resulted in its infrequent utilization in the debt
collection cases.
The courts are understandably less reluctant to act when the
"mental anguish" precipitates some physical disturbance which
tends to render less likely the possibility of a fabricated suit. 1 The
prevailing view has been embodied in the decision of a recent
California case:
4 -2
"The important elements are that the act is intentional, that
it is unreasonable, and that the actor should recognize it as
likely to result in illness. Given these elements the modern
cases recognize that mere words, oral or written, which result
in physical injury to another are actionable."
43
Notwithstanding the unassailability of this statement as a gen-
eral exposition of law, if the fright inducing the physical injury is
38. Gadbury v. Blejtz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925) (Recovery was allowed
for mental suffering alone). Recovery was also allowed for mental suffering, though not
followed by .physical injury, in .LaSalle"Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457,
253 N.W. 424 (19,34) (Creditor, for a period of nearly two years, sent collection letters
to the debtor, to his employer, and' to his neighbors. One read, "Honest men pay their
debts. Dishonest rden-. do. not. pay their debts. You owe us $140. Classify yourself."
Others were ii the form of pseudo-legal notices or were printed on bright red paper).
39. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214- Iowa -1303, 242 N.W: 25--(1932) (Col-
lection letters were sent to the plaintiff threatening to sue, to appeal to the plaintiff's
employer and to ' . bother him until he is so disgusted with you that he will throw
you out the back door", and to ".. . tie you up tighter than a drum.").
40. Id. 242 N.W. at 28.
41. Duty v. General Finance Co., 273 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1954) (Creditor left red cards
in debtor's door; called debtor's mother, and brother long distance collect; accused debtor
of being a deadbeat and threatened to blacklist him with a credit association; threatened
to garnishee debtor's wages and to 'cause him to lose his job; flooded debtor with collection
letters at home and at work; caused special delivery letters and telegrams to be de-
livered at midnight); ;Kirby v. Jules :'Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625
(1936) (Collector's statement to. debtor that she was a G-- D --- deadbeat and that
she would pay when he brought the sheriff resulted in the premature birth of a dead
child).
42. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App.2d 897, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) (Defend-
ant telephoned plaintiff's neighbor late at night and asked to speak with plaintiff, stating
that the call was an emergency call. When plaintiff reached the telephone, defendant
said, "Please bear up. I know this is going to be a shock; it is as much a shock to me to
have to tell you as it will be, to you." Plaintiff answered that she could, take the
message, whereupon defendant stated, "This is the Federal Outfitting Corlpany-why
don't you pay' your bill?" Plaintiff owed nothing, and recovered for mental shock and
resultant physical- injury).
43. Id. 216 P.2d at 572.
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produced by a creditor's threat that he will exercise a legal right
to protect his interests, recovery has been denied.
44
IV. Assault by Agent
The liability of a principal for an assault made by his collector
upon a debtor is, of course, a question of agency, and determination
of whether the collector was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment is usually for the jury.45  While each case must neces-
sarily stand upon its own facts, it appears to be the general rule
that when the assault has as its sole motivation the furtherance of
the agent's personal interests,' or when brought about entirely by
reason of the collector's personal feelings of enmity toward the
debtor, 47 the courts will refuse to hold the principal liable. In
ascertaining the agent's actual authority, it is usually held that the
mere hiring for the purpose of collecting debts does not vest th.
agent with the authority to resort to assault as a means of obtaining
payment.4" However, if it appears that authority to use force was
actually given, or that the use of force was not unusual in the
employer's business, there is no question but that: the principal is
liable for the agent's misconduct.4' Obviously, the same result




The dictum that, "There is a growing tendency to check offen-
sive collection methods",51 appears to have little real support. Ex-
amination of the cases reveals that the creditor rather than the
debtor occupies the more favorable position, particularly during
reecnt years. As has been indicated, this does not mean that a
creditor may harass his debtor in a manner wholly untrammeled
44. Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943); Peoples Finance
and Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413 82 P.2d 994 (1938) (Plaintiff gave birth to a
premature child following a collector's threat to take plaintiff's furniture if payment was
not made. It was held that there could be no recovery as the defendant was merely
threatening to do what he had a legal right to do).
45. Empire Clothing Co. v. Hammons, 17 Ala. App. 60, 81 So. 838 (1919); Manol
v. Moskin Bros. Inc., 203 Wis. 47, 233 N.W. 579 (1930).
46. McDermott v. American Brewing Co., 105 La. 124, 29 So. 498 (1901) (The
debt occasioning the assault was the sole responsibility of the agent); Rohrmoser v.
Household Finance Corp., 231 Mo. App. 1188, 86 S.W.2d 103 (1935) (Collector sug-
gested to plaintiff that coition could be profitable and tore off part of plaintiff's dress.
The Court rejected the contention that the agent was proposing to plaintiff that she be-
come a prostitute so as to obtain funds to pay the agent's principal, stating that the
assault had for its obvious purpose the establishing of sexual relations between the agent
and plaintiff, a radical departure from the master's business).
47. Jax Beer Co. v. Tucker, 146 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
48. Citizen's Finance Co. v. Walton, 239 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1951); Hill v. McQueen,
204 Okla. 394, 230 P.2d 483 (1951); Restatement, Agency, §245 (1933).
49. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Paddock, 219 Ind. 672, 40 N.E.2d 697 (1942);
see Moskins Stores, Inc. v. De Hart, 217 Ind. 622, 29 N.W.2d 948 (1940).
50. See Reece v. Ebersbach, 152 Fla. 763, 9 So.2d 805, 806 (1942).
51. See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, supra note 33 at 67.
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by legal restrictions. What it does mean is that in the absence of
conduct so unreasonable as to be almost entirely without any con-
ceivable justification, an irate debtor will find expenditure of funds
in satisfaction of his obligation to be a more rewarding investment
than prosecution of a law suit against his overzealous creditor.
H. M. PIPPIN.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-THE REQUIREMENT OF SPECIAL
INJURY.-The action of malicious prosecution is a specific tort,
classified by Cooley as a wrong affecting personal security.1 A
cause of action for malicious prosecution is based on breach of
that legal duty which every man owes to another to refrain frorn
instituting proceedings when malice is present and he has no
probable cause to justify his action. It has been stated that such a
prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause
to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.2 The
action of malicious prosecution has been referred to as one not
favored by the law3 but it is agreed that when the requisite ele-
ments exist the action will lie.
The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are: (1)
the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil
judicial proceeding by the present defendant against the present
plaintiff; (2) its bona fide termination in favor of the present
plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding;
(4) the presence of malice; and, (5) damage resulting to the pres-
ent plaintiff.' The burden is upon the plaintiff to show the con-
current existance of these requirements.
The question of the quantum of damage the plaintiff must suf-
fer when the action is founded on the malicious prosecution of a
civil suitV is a perplexing one. One view is that an action will not
lie unless there has been an arrest of the person, seizure of prop-
erty or other special injury which would not necessarily result in
all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action.°
1. Cooley, Torts 381 (4th Ed. 1932).
2. See Burt v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905); Kunz v. Johnson, 74
S. D. 577, 57 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1953).
3. See, e.g., Ball v. Rewles, 93 Cal. 222, 28 Pac. 937, 938 (1892); Alexander v.
Petty, 108 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 1954); Davis v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291 S.W. 412
(1927); North Point Construction Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441, 444 (1945).
4. See Turner v. J. Black & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So.2d 93, 94 (1941); Kunz v.
Johnson, supra note 2 at 118.
5. The discussion of damage herein is confined to damage arising from the prosecu-
tion of a civil suit. The conflict concerning quantum of damage is not present when the
-suit complained of was a criminal action.
6. See, e.g., Counihan v. Ferrell, 89 Ga. 795, 81 S.E.2d 215 (1954); Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 285 Il. App. 560, 2 N.E.2d 751 (1936), affirmed, 366 I1. 247, 8 N.E.2d
